UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

IN RE: . Case No. 23-11289-pb

. Chapter 11

560 SEVENTH AVENUE OWNER

PRIMARY LLC and 560 SEVENTH

AVENUE OWNER SECONDARY LLC, . One Bowling Green

. New York, NY 10004

Debtors.

• Friday, December 8, 2023

2:00 p.m.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

TRANSCRIPT OF EMERGENCY MOTION FOR ENTRY OF AN ORDER

(I) CONFIRMING CHANGE OF CONTROL OF DEBTOR 560 SEVENTH AVENUE OWNER PRIMARY LLC; (II) TERMINATING PRIOR MANAGEMENT;

AND (III) GRANTING RELATED RELIEF [81]

BEFORE THE HONORABLE PHILIP BENTLEY

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT JUDGE

ZOOM APPEARANCES:

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Also Present:

STEVEN SCHROEDER

GREG DENTON

BRANDON FLURY

1	(Proceedings commence)
2	THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: Good afternoon, this is Greg
3	White, the courtroom deputy. We're here today on Case Number
4	23-11289, 560 Seventh Avenue Owner Primary LLC and 560 Seventh
5	Avenue Owner Secondary LLC on the emergency motion for entry of
6	an order confirming change of control of debtor, terminating
7	prior management, and granting related relief.
8	At this time, for those who wish to speak, please go
9	ahead and state your name and who you represent for the record.
10	MR. NASH: Good afternoon. Kevin Nash for the
11	debtors.
12	MR. STRICKON: Good afternoon. Harvey Strickon for
13	the AREPIII MVTS, LLC, and CREP Times Square Hotel LLC.
14	MR. SCHMIDT: Good afternoon. Frederick Schmidt of
15	Cozen O'Connor, proposed counsel for 560 Seventh Avenue Owner
16	Primary LLC.
17	MR. GREENE: Good afternoon. Anthony Greene,
18	Cadwalader, Wickersham and Taff on behalf of OWS CRE Funding I,
19	LLC.
20	MR. RINGEL: Good afternoon. Fred Ringel from Leech
21	Tishman Robinson Brog on behalf of DHG TSQ LLC, the hotel
22	manager.
23	MR. MARKOWITZ: Good afternoon. Scott Markowitz,
24	Tarter Krinsky and Drogan for Garment Center Congregation. I'm
25	not sure I'll say anything, but I'm appearing.

1 And Harvey, your voice thing is still off again from last time. You should check it. It's not clear. 2 MR. REICH: Good afternoon. Jeffrey Reich from the 3 4 Law Firm of Reich, Reich, Reich, PC. We represent IMCMV Times 5 Square LLC, tenant. MR. MASUMOTO: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Brian 6 Masumoto for the Office of the United States Trustee. 7 MR. GAGION: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Leo Gagion 8 from the Office of the United States Attorney General for the 9 10 Department of Taxation and Finance. 11 THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: Okay, thank you, everyone. 12 And the judge will be out in just a moment. 13 (Pause) THE COURT: Good afternoon. We're here on the 14 15 emergency motion of the purported representatives of the 16 debtor. I may refer to that party as the lenders, because 17 unless and until I find that they're in fact acting for the 18 debtor, they're really just representatives of the lenders. 19 And when I say lenders, I mean, at this point, Mr. Strickon's 20 clients, who I quess, Mr. Strickon, would it be accurate as 2.1 shorthand to say your clients are the senior mezzanine lenders? 2.2 MR. STRICKON: Yeah, they're the secondary debtor. 2.3 THE COURT: Correct. So let's try it again. What's 24 the best shorthand for your clients? 25 MR. STRICKON: I think just refer to them as the

1 lenders. THE COURT: Okay. Although, I don't want to get them 2 confused with Cadwalader's --3 4 MR. STICKON: No, Cadwalader will refer to their clients as OWS, One William Street. 5 THE COURT: Okay, I got to tell you, all these 6 7 acronyms make my head spin. So I think of your clients as, how about this, the second -- the lenders at secondary, and 8 Cadwalader's clients are the lenders at primary. 9 10 MR. STRICKON: That's fine. That's simple enough. 11 THE COURT: Okay. And I quess just to be clear, the 12 senior lenders at each of those two debtors. 13 MR. STRICKON: Correct. 14 THE COURT: Okay. All right. With that preamble, 15 before we get to argument, let me first ask whether anybody --16 you know, I'm a litigator by background, and so I like to do 17 things and follow the proper procedures and deal with the 18 evidence before getting to argument. And so that we have the 19 record closed before we get to argument. 20 So let me ask if any of the parties have evidence 21 they want to offer. And I'll start with Mr. Schmidt as the 2.2 movants counsel. 2.3 MR. SCHMIDT: Thank you, Your Honor. Good afternoon. 24 Thank you very much for being able to accommodate us today on 25 shortened notice. It's very important for the debtor, very

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important for this case. That said, we do not have any evidence to offer into the record. And Mr. Strickon is really going to be taking the laboring or at argument for our side of the ledger. THE COURT: Okay. I guess let me turn next to Mr. Nash. Well, sorry, just to be clear, since you mentioned 6 7 Mr. Strickon, Mr. Strickon, I gather you don't have evidence you want to offer either, do you? MR. STRICKON: That's correct, Your Honor. We did 9 quote in our papers certain provisions of the pledge and security agreement. But there is no dispute that those in fact are provisions and that they are accurate quotations. 13 THE COURT: Yes, I -- yes, I have several of the governing documents in front of me that we'll be talking about 15 in the course of argument. So I'm comfortable that those are in the record. But you have nothing other than the governing 17 documents? MR. STRICKON: No, Your Honor. 19 THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Nash. MR. NASH: No, Your Honor. I'm not putting anything other than the exhibits that I put in that were attached to the 2.3 letters and so forth. I do agree that the three operative documents, the two operating agreements in the pledge, I think 25 are in the record. I hope we sent in the hotel operating

1 agreement, which is primary, and I hope Your Honor's chamber's 2 got that. So --3 THE COURT: We did. MR. NASH: -- I think that there's two operating 4 agreements in the pledge. And the notice of disposition of 5 collateral and the other stuff that's online on the ECF, you 6 know, the notices that were sent and so forth. 7 8 THE COURT: So I'm sorry, I just want to be clear, 9 because I don't remember exactly what was the next to your 10 papers. I'm going to treat the two operating agreements, that 11 is the operating agreements for the two debtors and the pledge 12 agreement as being in the record and also the notice of 13 disposition of collateral. Remind me what else you next to 14 your papers. 15 MR. NASH: I think you just mentioned it, that 16 September 6th amended and restated notice -- notification of 17 disposition of collateral, which also had the -- as exhibits, 18 the bidding procedures, or the terms of sale for the public 19 auction and the memorandum of sale documents and the exhibits 20 that went along with that. That was part of my original 2.1 letter, which I incorporated, and that was issued by the 2.2 mezzanine lender. I did put in yesterday, I think, an exhibit, 2.3 which, if I'm not mistaken, was the operating agreement at the 24 mezzanine level. And we forwarded to chambers the operating 25 agreement at the hotel level, and it was referenced to the

pledge agreement by Mr. Strickon. And that's an agreement I 1 think is in the record at some place dated September 13th, 2 2021. But the quotations from it are not disputed. We're all, 3 4 I think, operating under the same set of agreements. 5 THE COURT: Okay. And let me just invite anyone else to chime in if -- either if they have any issues with my 6 7 considering the documents Mr. Nash mentioned, or if there's any other documents that they think I should be considering in 8 connection with this motion. 9 10 Okay, so I just wanted to make sure we're clear on 11 what I'm looking at before we proceed. All right, so let's 12 move into argument. Mr. Schmidt, it's your motion. MR. SCHMIDT: Yes, Your Honor. On behalf of sort of 13 14 the, I guess we call it the mezz lender side of the equation, 15 Mr. Strickon will be taking the laboring war for arguments. 16 So, unless Your Honor has any specific questions for me, I'll 17 hand it over to Mr. Strickon. 18 THE COURT: That's fine. 19 Mr. Strickon, please proceed. 20 MR. STRICKON: Yes, Your Honor. As the first 2.1 observation, the objections that have been filed by the debtor 2.2 to the relief that's being sought, in our view, is nothing more 2.3 than stalling and vindictiveness and apparent retribution by a 24 principal of the debtor, because the debtor's principal is 25 being the subject of a litigation on his personal guarantee.

The truth of the matter -- yeah, the truth of the matter, you 1 know, it -- yeah? 2 THE COURT: Mr. Strickon, I'm going to cut you off 3 4 for a second. I'm under a somewhat tight schedule here. MR. STRICKON: I'll go to the next point, Your Honor. 5 THE COURT: Yeah, but just let me make it clear so 6 7 that the parties have a common understanding. I have another 8 hearing at 4. I need to spend half an hour preparing for that. So we need to be done --9 10 MR. STRICKON: Good. 11 THE COURT: -- ideally in an hour. And so I'd ask 12 you to -- I don't want to hear about -- well, here's what I 13 want to hear about. I want to hear about what you believe your 14 client's rights are under the governing documents. And also, 15 your position on whether this is really an emergency, because 16 frankly, I'm not seeing an emergency. But those are the two 17 things I'd like to hear you on. 18 If there's other things you think I have to hear 19 about, you can let me know. But I really don't want to hear 20 about any sort of back and forth about equities that are 21 independent of the two things. 2.2 MR. STRICKON: That's fine. I'll just hit the legal 2.3 points. At the last conference, Your Honor, the debtor made a 24 point of accusing the lenders of trying to avoid the payment of 25 transfer taxes. What I just want to say briefly on this, that

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    there's no evil intent here. The debtor -- the secured lenders
    are looking to utilize an express tax exemption under the
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    bankruptcy code that has been used for decades. And in fact,
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    in the old days, they even used this exemption in connection
    with 363 sales until the Supreme Court says you can't do that.
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              Those are issues that will be addressed at the time
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    of confirmation of any plan of reorganization. So it's
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    premature to make any observations about that. Mr. Nash has
    not really presented any controlling legal authority as to why
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    the provisions and the change in control are not fully
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    enforceable. In fact, the lenders were provided as the -- yes,
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    sir?
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              THE COURT: Mr. Strickon, I'm sorry to interrupt
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    again, but before we get to that, and I absolutely want to hear
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    you --
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              MR. STRICKON: Sure.
              THE COURT: -- on (indiscernible), but can we start,
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    please, with whether this really is an emergency?
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              MR. STRICKON: Yes, it is an emergency, Your Honor.
    Because of the cloud that has been created on who's in charge
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    here, vendors are unwilling to deal, quite frankly, with either
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    party until they have some knowledge or understanding as to
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    who's really in charge. And that's --
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              THE COURT: Here's the problem I have with that. You
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    are -- you and your co-counsel are both capable lawyers. I
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assume you know how to make a record. You have apparently
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    chosen not to make any factual record whatsoever on the need
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    for expeditious relief. All I have is a single, very short
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    paragraph in a lawyer's affidavit. That is not evidence.
              So I just want to make clear, I want to hear what you
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    have to say, but my starting point is you and your co-counsel
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    have chosen not to make a record of any need for expeditious
    relief.
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              MR. STRICKON: Well, I think the need for expeditious
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    relief was created by Mr. Nash on behalf of --
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              THE COURT: You're (indiscernible).
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              MR. STRICKON: That's where it all started, Your
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    Honor.
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              THE COURT: Mr. Strickon, you are asking me to
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    shorten time.
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              MR. STRICKON: Yeah.
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              THE COURT: I am hearing you on less than 48 hours'
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    notice. My clerks got up at 6 a.m. this morning to read the
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    reply brief. So I want to hear why you're telling me I've got
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    to decide today.
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              MR. STRICKON: Well, one issue, for example, is that
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    NEC, which install the telephone and security systems in the
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    hotel, is threatening to yank them out because they haven't
    been paid. And you --
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              THE COURT: They have --
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1 THE STRICKON: Yeah? THE COURT: You have to make a record of that. 2 3 MR. STRICKON: I'm sorry? 4 THE COURT: You have chosen not to make a proper 5 evidentiary record --6 MR. STRICKON: Yeah. We put it in our argument, 7 okay? And with a --THE COURT: Exactly (indiscernible) --8 9 MR. STRICKON: -- shortened period of time, I can't 10 get an affidavit from NEC, although I'm not sure if their 11 counsel may be here, and their counsel could make a statement 12 to that effect also. I understand the shortness in the time, 13 but, you know, I'm trying to get the point across that there 14 are operational issues. And I think Mr. Nash will even confirm 15 that there are operational issues because of uncertainty as to 16 who's in charge here. 17 THE COURT: So give me your full litany in as much 18 detail as you have available of what the urgent -- what the 19 urgency comes -- what the facts are that demonstrate the need 20 for immediate action. 2.1 MR. STRICKON: Well, I mentioned the fact that the 2.2 NEC has contacted us and is threatening to shut down the 2.3 telephone and security systems since they haven't been paid. 24 We understand, we've done a preliminary investigation, that the 25 debtor has run up a million dollars in unpaid sales tax and

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occupancy taxes and some \$100,000 in penalties for non-payment. It's -- the urgency is that the operation of the hotel at this point is getting, you know, worse and worse as the days go by because nobody has taken a firm control over getting these creditors satisfied so that the hotel can operate flawlessly. And the debtor has done nothing in these cases in five months. There's been nothing to address any of the claims. nothing that's ever been presented to the Court as to what the debtor intends to do if it gets more time. Indeed, the debtor has gotten additional time when they could refinance and pay off the mezzanine debt and redeem the property, but they haven't done anything there either. Whereas our clients have actually entered into an agreement with One William Street. It's been executed to restructure the senior debt to get this case moving. THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Strickon --MR. STRICKON: Yeah? THE COURT: -- let me sharpen the question a little If I were to say I'm not satisfied, and I want to get into the merits in a moment, but assume for a moment that my ruling today maybe I am not persuaded that you have shown an entitlement to the relief that's requested. However, I am -that -- I might make that ruling without prejudice to your ability to come back on regular notice and have a hearing, you know, say, two or three weeks from now. What I want to hear

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    is, are you really telling me that there would be meaningful
    harm suffered because of the delay between today and let's call
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    it three weeks from now?
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              MR. STRICKON: Yeah. I believe so, and I believe
    that if that was the Court's ruling, Mr. Nash would be back
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    into court asking for relief because of the fact that his
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    client -- I shouldn't say his client, the principals that
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    purportedly are running the hotel have had their hands tied
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    because of the cloud created on the control issue. We didn't
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    come to the Court in the initial. Don't forget, we didn't
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    start this proceeding. This was started by Mr. Nash when he
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    wrote a letter to the Court saying there's a cloud. We needed
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    to be removed.
              So I'm a little bit confused as to why the burden is
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    being put on us when we brought --
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              THE COURT: (Indiscernible).
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              MR. STRICKON: -- back this motion in the first
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    place.
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              THE COURT: No. It's because he didn't make a
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    motion. He --
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              MR. STRICKON: Oh, that's right. That's right.
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              THE COURT: And I was very clear at the status
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    conference that I don't grant relief, generally speaking --
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              MR. STRICKON: Yeah.
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              THE COURT: -- at status conferences. I require a
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proper motion. So you and your co-counsel then made an emergency motion. That's why I'm busting your chops about the lack of evidence. MR. STRICKON: Well, the answer is that Mr. Nash -we had -- somebody had to make a motion to bring this on so we could have a conference with Your Honor on Friday of this week. THE COURT: Okay. MR. STRICKON: And so, you know, and it didn't appear that Mr. Nash was doing anything. So we were the ones that took the laboring oar. THE COURT: All right, let's turn to the merits. me tell you what the problem I have is with your position. You have put one document before me, the pledge agreement, and reading just the pledge agreement, which by the way is all that I had before me at the status conference, it appears to support your position. What you did not put before me is the operating agreement, or maybe the title used in this case for it is the LLC agreement. You didn't put that before me and you didn't address the governing law, Delaware corporate law. And when I look at both of those, which I've now done, they're darn clear. They say your clients, as the lenders and the pledgees, have the right to take over management functions, exercise management powers upon a foreclosure, but not before. In other words, it's flat out contrary to what one of the provisions of the pledge agreement says.

1 That's what I want you to address, because frankly, I look at that and I do not see any basis to rule in your favor. 2 MR. STRICKON: Well, I, you know, (indiscernible) of 3 4 time, one thing I can see in reference to Your Honor is that at the closing, our clients received an enforceability opinion. 5 And not, you know, unusual, the enforceability opinion came 6 from Mr. Nash's own firm that these documents were enforceable 7 in accordance with their terms. And as we voted in our re-8 trial (indiscernible) during the service --9 10 THE COURT: Mr. Strickon, you're having audio 11 problems again. And I'm saying this because half of what you 12 just said, I could not hear. It sounded like you were 13 underwater. 14 MR. STRICKON: What I'm saying, Your Honor, is that 15 the pledge agreement would state --16 THE COURT: I can't hear you. Mr. Strickon, take me 17 off the speaker and speak into your phone. It's the only way 18 I'm going to be able to hear you. 19 MR. STRICKON: I'll dial into my phone and then I'll 20 deal with my --21 (Pause) 2.2 MR. STRICKON: Can you hear me now, Your Honor? 2.3 THE COURT: Yes, I hear you. Now I hear an 24 echo. That's really weird. 25 MR. STRICKON: Let me take off the speaker. Can

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you hear me now, Your Honor?
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                   THE COURT: Yeah, there's an echo.
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                   MR. STRICKON: Wait a second. How about -- not
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    very good at going on at the same time. Let me try again
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    without the phone.
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                   THE COURT: Okay.
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                   MR. STRICKON: Can you make me out now, Your
    Honor?
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                   THE COURT: Now it's clear. Fingers crossed.
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                   MR. STRICKON: Okay. Sorry about that.
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                   THE COURT: Let me make a request. This is the
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    second hearing in a row that this has happened in. Let me
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    make -- let me strongly urge you to call your tech people and
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    get this fixed before the next hearing, because it makes it
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    difficult to conduct our business.
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                   MR. STRICKON: Okay. What I was saying is that
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    the pledge agreement is quite clear. Okay. And it does
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    provide that we can exercise all rights and remedies as if we
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    were the member of the primary. And the -- there is nothing in
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    the -- what do you call it -- the operating agreement or
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    Delaware law that says we cannot do that.
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                   THE COURT: That's absolutely not true.
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    Delaware law says that unless the operating agreement or the
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    LLC agreement --
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                   MR. STRICKON: Mm-hmm.
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1 THE COURT: -- (indiscernible) it doesn't say a pledge agreement can give you these rights. It says unless the 2 LLC agreement so provides, you don't get management rights 3 4 until you foreclose. MR. STRICKON: I'm going to have to check with 5 our corporate people who are familiar with all these documents. 6 7 I'm only a bankruptcy lawyer, but I will tell you that at the closing of the transaction, the lenders obtained an opinion 8 letter from counsel to the borrower that these agreements are 9 10 all enforceable and in accordance with their terms. 11 THE COURT: So you (indiscernible) --12 MR. STRICKON: And that's Mr. Nash's firm, by 13 the way. 14 THE COURT: Yeah. You know, there's two 15 relevant provisions of the pledge agreement. You quoted both 16 of them in your letter. You didn't -- you only mentioned one 17 of them just now. The other one is relevant because it says 18 that upon a default, you have management powers to the maximum 19 extent permitted by law. So, that provision appears -- looks 20 to me like it's a reference to the limitations contained in the 2.1 LLC statute. 2.2 MR. STRICKON: I went through the LLC agreement 2.3 very quickly, and I didn't see any limitations in the LLC 24 agreement. Unless Mr. Nash is able to point them out. 25 THE COURT: I'm sorry. You're having audio

1 problems again. MR. STRICKON: (Indiscernible) I very quickly 2 3 went through the LLC agreement to try to find provisions that 4 would bear on the exercise of theses remedies, and I was unable 5 to find anything. THE COURT: You said the LLC agreement or the 6 LLC statute? 7 8 MR. STRICKON: The LLC agreement or the LLC 9 statutes. 10 THE COURT: So look at -- okay. So the LLC 11 statute is Delaware -- it's section 18-702(b)(3) of the 12 Delaware LLC statute. And the operative provision of the LLC 13 agreement is section 23(b) and(c). You know what? I'm going 14 to -- I don't want to pause while you read those sections now. 15 I want to ask you, is there anything else you want to include 16 in your argument? Then I'll turn to Mr. Nash. And when he and 17 others have had their say, I'll let you tell me what you have 18 to say about the statute and the LLC agreement. Because by 19 then you'll have had some time to review them. Does that 20 seem -- does that work from your standpoint? 21 Okay. Mr. Nash, it's your turn. 2.2 MR. NASH: Yes, Your Honor. We did put in objections 2.3 to the motion. And I'd like to just, you know, go towards the 24 emergency to (indiscernible). I hope that's my voice. Maybe 25 now I have a problem.

1 Can you hear me, Judge? THE COURT: Yeah, that's better. It actually was not 2 3 perfect a moment ago. MR. NASH: I got a little nervous there. We did -- I 4 don't think there's an emergency here, Judge. This hotel is 5 running under the cash collateral order. We submitted an 6 extension this week, I believe Wednesday. All the bills and 7 the expenses at our hotel will be paid through the cash 8 collateral order. I've been very responsive to the senior 9 10 lender in addressing cash collateral concerns. 11 The issue that Mr. Strickon raised today happened to 12 do with I gave approval to pay the money directly instead of --13 and we have this in a new cash collateral order, instead of 14 switching it over to the DIP account. Expenses are paid. 15 They're budgeted. I'm sure between now and if we have this on 16 regular notice, Mr. Strickon and I can come up with a protocol. 17 Everybody's in favor of making sure expenses are paid. 18 I do think they overplayed the issue of an emergency 19 nature of this motion. As Your Honor said, there is no 20 evidence of anything of that nature in the documents. And I do 21 think that the emergency nature, there's no basis for that. 2.2 I do recognize the issue. The issue is what happens 2.3 if there's an incomplete foreclosure sale, and that's what 24 we're dealing with. 25 THE COURT: Yeah. Mr. Nash, before you turn to that,

let me just ask you, sticking with the emergency issue for a 1 moment. What's your response to what Mr. Strickon said about 2 NEC threatening to cut you off? 3 4 MR. NASH: There -- I got a call literally two hours or three hours before the hearing from the senior lender. 5 Thev received a request for payment, and the issue there was instead 6 7 of taking the money from the suspense account and putting it into the DIP account, which is -- would take a little bit of 8 9 time, was it okay to pay it directly from the suspense account? 10 I immediately said yes. I copied Mr. Strickon on that email, 11 and I -- and the senior lender then copied Mr. Strickon. 12 So going into the hearing, Mr. Strickon was aware 13 that that issue has been addressed. I think it's fair to say I 14 got a phone call, and I addressed it within five minutes' time. 15 And so the goal here is -- there's a dispute as to a legal 16 issue. The goal here is not to do anything to harm the hotel 17 between three sets of lawyers. And I am more than confident, 18 because we're on our fourth or third extension of cash 19 collateral, we do have the budgets in place, that all of these 20 issues can be easily addressed. And I understand, if I'm not 2.1 mistaken, Your Honor has the extension of cash collateral. 2.2 So I dealt with that issue this morning. 2.3 Mr. Strickon knew I dealt with it, and I will continue to deal 24 with all administrative issues. We have never stood in the way 25 of paying any bill, any expense. The cash collateral order

1 does have, you know, procedures in terms of funding into one account into another, but we will never stand in the way of 2 3 making sure expenses are paid. 4 THE COURT: And sorry, I have one question. I didn't follow the acronym that Mr. Strickon used. I think it was NEC? 5 Who are they? 6 MR. NASH: I -- if I'm not mistaken, I think that's 7 8 the name of the big company that does the servicing for the hotel at the phone level. Is that the NEC company, the old NEC 9 10 company, Mr. Strickon? 11 MR. STRICKON: Yeah. NEC is the equipment leasing 12 company. And the one thing that I didn't mention is that the 13 lenders were under the assumption that the equipment had been 14 purchased. And according to NEC, it was not purchased. It was 15 subject to an equipment lease, and that the debtor was in 16 arrears in making its monthly lease payments. 17 AUTOMATED VOICE SYSTEM: You're muted. 18 THE COURT: Okay, thank you for the clarification. 19 Mr. Nash, I'm not sure, did you respond to that 20 point, the point about NEC threatening to terminate? 2.1 MR. NASH: I got an email that they were -- my 2.2 information was they wanted to be paid, and we took care of 2.3 that this morning. 24 THE COURT: Okay. Let me ask you, because to me, it 25 seems plausible that, you know, when there's an uncertainty

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about who controls and has the right to manage a company of any sort, including a hotel, it strikes me as quite plausible that that could cause problems, operational problems. You're telling me that so far you don't think any problems have occurred or are likely to occur anytime soon? MR. NASH: Yes. You know, there isn't a hotel manager in place. What we're talking about is the senior level management of the hotel, not day-to-day operations. There's a hotel manager in place. The hotel manager actually runs the day-to-day. There's a budget in place. There is a -- we've been doing this for four or five months, and there's a protocol as to how payments are made. All the payrolls, as Your Honor may recall, you know, are a Tuesday item for the ADP services, and payroll checks go out on Fridays. So on a day-to-day level, the issues that we're having here will not impact the operations of the hotel on a day-to-day basis. We're talking about senior level management and not day-to-day management. THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. That's helpful. Here's what I propose. I guess, first, if Mr. Strickon has -have you had enough time to review the agreement on the statute, Mr. Strickon? Because if --MR. STRICKON: I have it in front of me, by me, so I'm asking if you could redirect me to the specific provision that's given you proposed.

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              THE COURT: Are you talking about the statute or the
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    agreement?
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                             Statute. The statute, the Delaware --
              MR. STRICKON:
              THE COURT: Yeah. So it's Title VI of the Delaware
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    Code.
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              MR. STRICKON: Yeah, Section 18.
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              THE COURT: Section 18-702 (b) (3).
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              MR. STRICKON: Okay.
              THE COURT: And then did you get the section of the
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    LLC agreement that I referred to?
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              MR. STRICKON: Yes.
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              THE COURT: Okay. All right.
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              So we're going to go back to -- so I'll give you a
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    little more time, and I'm going to go back to -- I -- Mr. Nash,
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    I think what probably makes sense is, let me hear if you have
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    anything more you want to say about the emergency, the need for
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    urgent action or the lack thereof. After that, I want to hear
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    if anybody else wants to address that issue, including -- it
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    would be nice if we could hear from the counsel for the
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    manager, if they're prepared to weigh in on that. And after
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    that, we'll go back to Mr. Strickon to respond on the merits.
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    I think, Mr. Nash, it probably makes sense for him to make his
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    argument before I ask you to respond to him.
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              MR. NASH: That's fine, Your Honor.
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              THE COURT: Okay. So are you done on the emergency
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1 issue, or did you have more to say on that? 2 MR. NASH: No, I think I've completed that. THE COURT: Okay. So, Mr. -- I believe it's 3 4 Mr. Ringel, representing the manager? MR. RINGEL: Yes, Your Honor. What I have heard from 5 my client is that the operations are continuing in accordance 6 with the cash collateral order, as one would expect. And 7 beyond that, we really don't want to get into the middle or 8 9 we're really agnostic as to the change of ownership issue. 10 It's a legal issue for the Court to decide. But operationally, 11 from a day-to-day point of view, it's my understanding that 12 it's operating in accordance with the budget and so on. 13 THE COURT: Okay. All right. Thank you. And to be 14 clear, I did not mean to ask you to weigh in on the merits 15 issue. 16 MR. RINGEL: Understood, Your Honor. Thank you. 17 THE COURT: Okay. 18 Does anybody else, before I turn back to Mr. Strickon 19 and turn to the merits, does anybody else want to be heard on 20 the emergency issue? 21 MR. REICH: Judge, if I may just be heard on second 2.2 overall, because we are affected by all this. I represent --2.3 by the way, I'm Jeffrey Reich from the Reich Law Firm, and I --24 we represent IMCMV Times Square LLC. My client is a -- I think 25 the largest tenant other than the hotel, in that they run the

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Margaritaville Restaurant and Entertainment Facility in Times Square, which is the bottom floor, and also have a contract with the hotel where they provide services to the hotel for what I understand to be all their culinary needs, so to speak.

And I can't really comment on the emergency issue, but I will comment to this level that this needs to be dealt with because it is causing uncertainty for my client. It's causing uncertainty for everybody. I can't say, and I will not say that it has to be dealt with today, but it does need to be dealt with. And it's really not for the Court. This is not for the Court. It's really for the parties that this needs to end on one way or the other because it's going to interfere with hurting those that are within the building and trying to provide services for the hotel.

There was one instance where I believe recently there was a late payment to my client. I believe that's been cured. I'm not here to make a factual record. I'm simply making a point that this does need to be dealt with, whether it's today, three weeks from now, or four weeks from now, and I urge the parties to deal with it because it is going to hurt not only the lenders, but those in the building.

THE COURT: So I appreciate your point. It sounds highly plausible to me. But just to put a fine point on the emergency issue, I gather you are not saying to me that if I decided it's three weeks from now, that would be too late.

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MR. REICH: That's correct, Your Honor. I just made my point to tell the Court, I guess, from the street's perspective, in a very real sense, that this issue hanging over not only my client, but the hotel, the restaurant, the entertainment facility, it interferes, right? Because people need to know with certainty whether they have jobs, certainly in the management company Ed Allen, who we're dealing with. And I don't think I need to say anything further, Judge. I know you're time-pressed, but it's something that needs to be dealed [sic] with, but certainly not today. THE COURT: Okay. All right. Thank you. Thank you for that. Would -- does anybody else want to be heard on the emergency issue? MR. GREENE: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Anthony Greene from Cadwalader Wickersham Taft, on behalf of OWS CRE Funding I, senior lender of the primary Debtor. We share the view that these cases need an expeditious resolution and therefore this issue as well. Clarity over who has title and control over the debtor will assist with operations. We've been working with the debtor. We have a proposed interim cash cloud order we submitted jointly this week. However, there have been some difficulties in getting bills paid. There have been bills that have been submitted to OWS for funding. We've funded the DIP account and they still

have not been paid. I understand these issues are ongoing and we believe a resolution of this issue will aid in the operation of the hotel.

THE COURT: Well, and I'm going to ask you the same question I just asked Mr. Ringel. If I decide this issue three or four weeks from now rather than today, does that cause -- does that delay cause problems?

MR. GREENE: Well, in our view, the sooner this is resolved, I think, the better. So if there is additional briefing required, we would ask that it be on some sort of truncated schedule so that we can have a resolution as expeditiously as possible.

THE COURT: Okay. But nobody's falling off a cliff two weeks from now or any - you don't want to point me to any specific harm that's about to occur at some definite date.

MR. GREENE: Well, Your Honor, in the revised fifth interim cash cloud order we submitted, there are some minor nits that we think would prevent harm in the event that there -- additional time is required, including as to the manner in which we receive invoices and the manner in which certain expenses are funded or paid.

For example, in the event, you know, there's an issue with payroll and OWS needs to fund it directly from one of these existing accounts, the new order provides the flexibility to do that. So in the event that the clarity issue is not

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    resolved immediately, we believe that the new order will allow
    us the flexibility to operate during that interim period.
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              THE COURT: Okay. And just remind me, if you would,
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    that I quess the interim order, I believe, is currently before
    me. That is, I think it was filed. I think it's been signed
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    by both sides and it has been sent to chambers.
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              MR. GREENE: Yes. Both the -- Harvey's --
    Mr. Strickon's group and Mr. Nash's group have reviewed and
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    signed off on the order.
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              THE COURT: Okay. And when does the authorization to
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    use cash collateral in that order expire?
              MR. GREENE: I believe it is on or around January
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    11th. It's just a one-month extension.
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              THE COURT: Okay. Okay. Thank you.
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              Does anybody else wish to be heard on the emergency
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    issue?
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              MR. GAGION: Your Honor, Leo Gagion for the New York
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    State Department of Taxation and Finance. Just peripheral
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    because we just want to put on the record, whenever your Honor
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    decides this, whether it's three weeks from now or today, the
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    state reserves all of its rights regarding the issue of the
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    application of Section 1146 to this transaction. And I've been
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    in -- while I don't represent the city, I have been informed by
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    counsel to the city that the New York City reserves those
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    rights as well. Thank you.
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1 THE COURT: Okay. Understood. 2 Anybody else? Again, just on the emergency issue. 3 Okay. 4 Mr. Strickon, have you had enough time to review --MR. STRICKON: Your Honor, I would like to point out, 5 number one, that Section 23(b) of the LLC agreement has an 6 7 acknowledgement by the company that the pledge of the limited 8 liability company interest in the company made by a member in connection with the senior mezzanine pledge agreement shall be 9 10 a pledge not only of its rights with respect to profits and 11 losses, but also a pledge of all rights, powers, and 12 obligations of the members. So the LLC agreement --13 THE COURT: You lost me. What provision are you 14 reading from? 15 MR. STRICKON: Section 23(b) of the LLC agreements is 16 an acknowledgement by the LLC that the pledge of the membership 17 interest includes all rights, powers, and obligations of the 18 member. 19 THE COURT: Okay. It then goes on to say some other 20 things that are quite relevant. 21 MR. STRICKON: Yeah. It does say, though, upon a 2.2 foreclosure, sale, or transfer, the successor member may 2.3 exercise rights and powers of the member, except to the extent 24 not so registered, cause the company to register to transfer. 25 It does go on to say other things, but the acknowledgement by

1 the company is exactly what's contemplated by the Delaware It says, unless the LLC agreement provides otherwise. 2 And in this case, the LLC agreement expressly 3 provides that the member may pledge its membership interest, as 4 5 well as pledging its right to exercise any powers that the member has under the LLC agreements. 6 THE COURT: The statute says that unless the LLC 7 agreement provides otherwise, the pledge of an interest --8 MR. STRICKON: Yeah, it says, unless the LLC 9 10 agreement provides otherwise. 11 THE COURT: But hang on. It says, unless the LLC 12 agreement provides otherwise, the pledge, quote, "shall not 13 cause the member to have the power to exercise any rights or powers of a member." 14 15 MR. STRICKON: Right. 16 THE COURT: Do you have any response to that, 17 because --18 MR. STRICKON: Yeah, my response is that the Delaware statute says, unless provided otherwise by the LLC agreement. 19 20 And this LLC agreement expressly authorizes a member to pledge 2.1 its membership interests and to grant, as part of that 2.2 membership interest, the right to exercise all powers otherwise 2.3 held by the member. 24 THE COURT: Okay. Do you have anything else? 25 MR. STRICKON: No, I think those provisions are quite

1 specific. 2 THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Nash, do you want to respond? I'm not sure you 3 4 really need to say much in response, but you're welcome to. MR. NASH: Judge, just briefly, I did lay out all 5 these statutes in my objection. Mr. Strickon has under his 6 7 pledge both economic and management rights. But, and this is the big but, for those to go into effect, he needs to complete 8 the foreclosure. When he doesn't complete the foreclosure, he 9 10 doesn't have automatic management rights. Everything is 11 predicated upon completing the foreclosure. The statute that 12 Mr. Strickon referred to is -- and it's fairly well recognized 13 at this point, the old rule was, if you pledged a membership 14 interest, you pledged economic entitlements, you can pledge 15 management entitlements as well. And had he foreclosed on and 16 completed the sale, he would have had both economic and 17 management rights. 18 The problem here is he did not complete the foreclosure. So, I do think he cannot exercise the management 19 20 rights outside of that. I did cite the statutes. I cited a 2.1 case in California with comparable type of language. And it's 2.2 not that he doesn't have the rights. He just didn't complete 2.3 the foreclosure. And Your Honor to hit on the language to the 24 extent permitted by Delaware law. I think Delaware law would 25 require a completion of foreclosure. And that's our position.

THE COURT: Okay.

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Would anybody else like to be heard on the merits issue? Okay. I'm not hearing any response.

All right. I -- here's what I'm going to do. It's now 3:04. Let's take a break for 10 minutes. And, well, let's say at 3:20 -- well, now it's 3:05. So, let's take a break for ten minutes. And in ten minutes, let's get back on and I will read my bench ruling. See you soon.

(Recess taken)

THE COURT: All right. Okay. I'm ready to read my ruling into the record. We're here on the emergency motion filed by Cozen O'Connor on behalf of certain purportedly authorized representatives, who I'll refer to either as the representatives or the movants. They're here as purported representatives of the primary debtor. But, of course, the issue before me is whether, in fact, they are properly acting on behalf of the primary debtor.

The representatives were purportedly appointed to their positions by a resolution of the executive committees of the mezzanine lenders of the secondary debtor. The emergency motion asks me to find on less than 48 hours' notice that the mezzanine lenders have full voting and managerial control over the primary debtor.

Based on this finding, the motion asks me to enter a number of -- enter an order -- sorry, let me try that again.

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Based on that finding, the motion asks me to order, one, that the change in control of primary described in the notice filed on the docket on November 15 is effective. Two, that prior management is terminated from their positions with primary.

Three, that primary's management and professionals are directed to cooperate with and provide information to the mezzanine lenders as entities in control of primary. And four, that the debtor can take all actions necessary to effectuate that release.

I'm going to decline to grant the requested relief for a number of reasons including principally that I don't find there's any showing of a need for emergency action. And two, that my preliminary view of the merits issue presented to me is that the lenders have not shown that they're likely to win on the merits. In fact, quite the contrary.

So what I'm going to do is I'm going to explain the reasons for my ruling. I'm then going to set this down for full briefing on a regular briefing schedule. And I'm going to set it for a hearing on January 12. I'm going to direct that the lenders file their brief one week from today. The lenders or authorized representatives, however we want to designate them. That the debtor file its responsive brief the following Friday. Obviously, I've set that schedule because the week after that is the week between Christmas and New Year's, and I assume that you all don't want to be briefing this during that

week. And I certainly don't want to hold a hearing that week. 1 Before I give a further explanation of my findings, 2 let me make one other point. And that is when the lenders do 3 come back with a further showing on the merits, I don't think 4 the lenders have properly thought through the relief they're 5 requesting. I think that if the lenders had persuaded me that 6 7 they were right or likely to win on the merits, that would 8 potentially have supported a finding that the lenders are entitled to exercise control over primary. That is, they're 9 10 allowed to step into the shoes of the current equity owners and 11 exercise all the rights that they would have as the holders of LLC interests. 12 13 It's -- several additional steps are required to get 14 from that conclusion, which is the issue that's really been 15 briefed, to get from there to the further types of relief that 16 I've been asked to enter, particularly the request that I 17 terminate management. That's something that needs to be done 18 pursuant to proper corporate procedures, not by a court 19 parachuting in and acting -- exercising powers under I don't 20 know what authority. And similarly, directing management's -21 sorry, directing the primary debtors management and 2.2 professionals to cooperate, there hasn't been a proper motion 2.3 made to support relief of that sort either. 24 So if the debtor wants to seek relief of any of those 25 sorts, I don't view that as being properly part of this motion.

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You're welcome to do a follow on motion if you win on January 12, you can file a follow on motion seeking relief of that sort. But you have not yet laid a necessary groundwork for me to consider granting that sort of relief, even if you win on the merits. Okay, let me turn first to whether there's an emergency and I'll then turn to the merits. As I mentioned, during the hearing, there's been absolutely no proper evidentiary showing supporting the need for emergency relief. There's simply a declaration from counsel, actually, counsel who's brand new to this case, and presumably doesn't know a whole lot about what's actually going on at the debtor. And counsel's declaration contains just conclusory statements. No detailed facts and no indication that this -- that these statements are based on personal knowledge, rather than being purely hearsay statements. So, counsel really should know better. You need to make a -- if you want relief from this Court, you need to make a proper evidentiary showing. Now, I am a bankruptcy court. And so I did -- I do want to do what's best for the debtor, even if counsel have not properly put the evidence before me. And so I did hear the arguments of the lawyers for what they're worth about whether harm is likely to occur if I don't rule on the merits today. And what I'm about to say on that score, I hesitate to say it because it's not based on evidence. But if what counsel said

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to me today were backed up by evidence, it still wouldn't support the need for emergency relief.

The one fact that I have before me that really is a fact, and not just lawyers say so, is that the parties have reached agreement on a new interim cash collateral order, which will run through January 11. There -- it also seems to be undisputed that there's a manager in place, and that the manager is able to continue to act on behalf of the hotel, despite the cloud caused by the uncertainty on the legal issue. And so you put all that together, it suggests to me that nothing terrible is going to happen if I defer ruling until mid-January, which is what I'm going to do.

And I -- the last thing I would say on that score is, you know, to the extent I'm giving any weight to statements of counsel, I found it encouraging that counsel for a number of relevant parties spoke up, including one of the Cadwalader lawyers, plus Mr. Ringel and Mr. Reich, and all of them seem to be in agreement that pushing this off till mid-January will not cause the sky to fall, although I suspect all of them agree that it is necessary to bring this issue to a head and decide it at some point before too long. And so that's what I plan to do. I do plan to rule shortly after the hearing that I'm scheduling.

Okay, let me turn to the merits. I have had a very limited amount of time and my clerks have had a very limited

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amount of time to research the issues that have been raised before me, and the issues are not simple. And that's why I'm not going to rule on the merits today. Instead, what I'm going to do is I'm going to tell you my tentative thinking that in the hope that that may help shape your research and the arguments you make in your briefs. And when you're performing next in January, I have a strong preliminary view that the debtors win this fight on the merits. That is, that the lenders had no proper legal basis to exercise the management rights conferred by the LLC interests prior to taking title with respect to those rights. I'm going to tell you why that's my strong leaning, but it's with the big caveat that my strong leaning is based on a limited amount of research and it's very possible that some of you will come up with stuff that I'm not aware of and that will change my mind. But nevertheless, here's what I'm looking at right The lender has pointed to two provisions of the pledge agreement, both in Section 7 of that agreement. The two provisions are significantly different. The one that Mr. Strickon mentioned first during his argument today, if one was looking at nothing else, nothing other than this provision, this would seem to be a winner for him. This is the provision that says, quote, "lender may exercise all membership rights, powers, and privileges following a default to the same extent

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as debtor is entitled to exercise such rights, powers, and privileges." On its face, that seems to be the relief that Mr. Strickon is asking for.

However, another passage in Section 7 of the same agreement is quite different. And I'm not going to read it verbatim. But to paraphrase, it essentially says that following default, the secured party can exercise management rights, quote, "to the maximum extent permitted by law." And that caveat is the crucial issue here, because as I'm about to address, applicable law, namely Delaware LLC law, appears to not allow a secured party to exercise management rights prior to foreclosure.

So there does -- there seems to be a tension between these two different passages that are both part of Section 7. Let me put a pin in that and turn to the Delaware law and the LLC agreement, and then I'm going to circle back to what does this say about how one interprets Section 7 of the pledge agreement.

The starting point in looking at Delaware law is the Delaware LLC statute, because primary, the debtor we're calling primary, is an LLC organized under Delaware law. So any issues concerning governance, LLC governance with respect to primary, including any issues concerning the construction of its LLC agreement or the implementation of that agreement, is governed by Delaware law.

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The Delaware LLC statute has some very relevant provisions, and I'm going to quote a few of them. And -the -- no, it says that, quote, unless otherwise provided in the party's LLC agreement, one, an assignment of an LLC -- I'm paraphrasing to some extent -- an assignment of an LLC interest does not entitle the assignee to become or to exercise any rights or powers of a member. Two, an assignment of an LLC interest does entitle the assignee to share in profits, losses, distributions, et cetera, of the LLC. Three, the pledge of or granting of a security interest in an LLC interest of a member shall not cause the member to cease to be a member or to have the power to exercise any rights or powers of a member. is, to reiterate, pledging the LLC interest does not strip the member of its powers as a member. And finally, assignees have, quote, "no right to participate in the management of the business and the affairs of an LLC, except as provided in the LLC agreement." And I've been quoting from section 18-70(a) of the Delaware LLC statute. In short, the upshot of these provisions is that members of an LLC have both economic interests and non-economic interests, the former being rights such as the right to share in profits and losses, and those rights are freely transferable. Non-economic rights, such as the power to manage the entity, are not transferable unless -- prior to foreclosure

unless otherwise provided in the LLC agreement.

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And by the way, New York law is the same, although I don't think that matters here because there's no question that primary is a Delaware LLC.

So the next question is, what does primary's LLC agreement say? And for starters, let me say I am not happy about the fact that the lenders came running into court seeking emergency relief on very short notice, and they chose to put before me the pledge agreement, but not the LLC agreement. And they chose not to mention Delaware's LLC statute.

Mr. Strickon mentioned that he is not a secure transactions lawyer. Well, guess what? I'm not either, and most bankruptcy judges are not. I think it's quite troubling to seek relief and especially emergency relief where the Court is going to have limited time to review the arguments and fail to mention something as critical as this. Frankly, I think it's somewhat comparable to failing to cite a Second Circuit decision that is contrary. And as you know, the ethics rules provide that that is a serious breach of ethics.

At my request, counsel for the debtor provided my chambers with a copy of the LLC agreement just a few hours before the hearing and we reviewed it. And Section 23 of that agreement is extremely relevant. It has a number of relevant revisions. And for starters, Section 23(b) provides that upon a foreclosure sale or other transfer of the LLC interests in primary under the pledge agreement, the mezzanine lender or

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other purchaser is automatically admitted as a member effective upon such foreclosure sale or other transfer.

It then says the following, quote, "upon a foreclosure sale or other transfer, the successor member is entitled to," quote, "exercise all the rights and powers of the member pursuant to this agreement, including the power to designate, appoint, expel, and remove the directors and officers of the company." So these are exactly the rights that the lenders are telling me they have, but their LLC agreement provides that they — explicitly that they do not have those powers until they have actually foreclosed, which they have not done.

Finally, section 23(c) provides that primary sole member, quote, "shall be permitted to pledge and upon any foreclosure of such pledge" -- sorry, "upon any foreclosure of such pledge in connection with the admission of the mezzanine lender or purchaser as a member, transfer to the mezzanine lender or other purchaser the member's rights and powers to manage and control the affairs of the company pursuant to the terms of the pledge agreement." So again, the power to manage the company kicks in for the lenders only upon foreclosure, not before.

So let's go back now to the to the pledge agreement.

As I mentioned earlier, the first of the two clauses -- or there are two clauses. One of them says that management rights are transferred upon default, quote, "to the maximum extent

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permitted by law", close quote. That provision clearly is very easy to harmonize with the LLC agreement and LLC statute provisions that I just discussed. You reach exactly the same conclusion. The other relevant pledge provision is harder to harmonize. Arguably, it conflicts. In which case, I think, but I encourage all of you to brief this if you think that's helpful. I think that if that other portion that I quoted from Section 7 of the pledge agreement, if that other portion of the agreement is flat out conflicts with the LLC agreement, I think it's legally ineffective, inoperative, because I don't think the pledge agreement can give powers that the member doesn't have under the LLC agreement. But again, I encourage you to brief that. I think another possible conclusion, another possible way to look at this passage from Section 7 is that the parties didn't really mean what it seems to say. And you have to read the expressed terms of this provision in conjunction with the other passage in Section 7, the one that does limit it to the extent permitted by law. And you have to say they really meant this should be construed to mean the same thing as that other passage. In any event, that's an issue that I encourage the

parties to brief, because to me, the answer to that question is

not obvious based on the record before me. And I quess I

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should also say, to the extent the parties wish to present evidence on how those provisions should be construed, or evidence on any other matter, bearing on the merits issue, you're welcome to do that. If you're going to do that, though, you know, just be aware in that event, the hearing in January will need to be an evidentiary hearing. It'll need to be in person in my courtroom. And there'll need to be advance notice and coordination concerning how testimony, witness testimony is going to be handled.

I guess what I should add is if you're going to do that, give me at least a week's advance notice and I'm going to want to schedule a pretrial conference at least a few days before the hearing to deal with any trial issues. Give me one moment.

That completes my preliminary ruling, my preliminary thinking on the merits issue. I welcome further briefing because, as I said, my thinking may not reflect everything that I should be considering and everything that you'll wish to bring before me when you have a bit more time to do so.

I do want to address one final issue before completing my bench ruling, and that is the automatic stay. Until today, until having analyzed the issues that are before me right now, I didn't think there was a stay issue. I didn't think the actions that lenders have been taking violated the stay or even, you know, raised a question as to whether they

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might be violating the stay. Based on what I now know, based on having now seen the LLC agreement and read the Delaware LLC, the relevant provisions of the Delaware LLC statute, I have a serious question whether the debtors may have -- whether the actions the debtors have already taken may have violated the automatic stay.

And I encourage the debtors to either raise this issue with me or not, as they see fit. But I want to share with you my thinking on that and then I leave it to the debtors, whether they want to bring a motion to address this or I guess if the lenders want to bring a sort of preemptive motion asking for a ruling that there's no stay violation, they're welcome to do that as well.

The starting point for thinking about the stay here is the stipulation and order that I entered lifting the automatic stay pursuant to the settlement reached by the parties some months ago. That stipulation was drafted by the two parties and -- which may be relevant to how one construes what it means. But I'll quote the relevant language. It said that the stay, quote, "is terminated so as to permit the mezzanine lender to proceed with the UCC disposition of the debtor's membership interest in primary and to exercise any and all other rights and remedies relating thereto."

Now, up to now, I had not seen any reason to disagree with the lenders characterization of what that latter phrase,

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rights and remedies relating thereto, meant. That is, I've not seen until now any reason to doubt that that included them taking steps purportedly standing in the shoes of the debtors management, such as purporting to replace the debtors manager and take other actions on behalf of the debtor. I think it's clear, though, based on my ruling so far that my prior reading of this provision may have been wrong.

That is, if my tentative ruling on the merits issue is correct and the lenders have no right until they foreclose

is correct and the lenders have no right until they foreclose to exercise any management powers on behalf of the debtor, then in that event, the phrase all other rights and remedies relating thereto would not seem to cover actions the lenders have taken to manage and control the debtor. That phrase instead would merely cover actions necessary to tee up the auction and sale of the membership interest, which is not the same thing as stepping into the debtor's shoes and purporting to manage the debtor.

So this is new to me. I had not thought of this problem. It should not have been new to the parties, because the parties drafted the LLC agreement. They were aware or arguably were on notice of what it said. I was not. It was not in the record before me until I asked for it and received it today.

So I think that's all I'll say on this front, but I think it's quite possible there has been a meaningful violation

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of the automatic stay by the lenders. I don't know whether that has caused any harm. It's quite possible it has not. And so this may not be enormously consequential, but I did want to say that that seems to be the implication of my tentative ruling on the merits issue. Give me -- I may be completed -- I may be done with my ruling. Give me one second. Oh, okay. My clerks have corrected me about scheduling. I think I misspoke when I said -- I may have misspoken when I said January 12. Let me put you on pause for a minute and I'll come back and clarify whether we're talking about a hearing on January 5 or on January 12. And then if the parties want to have availability issues, I'll obviously hear that as well. But first, give me one minute. (Pause) THE COURT: Okay, I'm back. Sorry if I -- I might have misspoken about the scheduling. What I meant to say or should have said is unless parties have a problem with this date, I want to schedule the hearing for January 5 at 2 p.m. And with the briefing schedule, the same as what I previously said, that is lender's brief due one week from today. Debtor's brief, that is Mr. Nash's brief, due one week thereafter. anybody have a problem with that schedule? MR. NASH: Your Honor, Kevin Nash, I'm traveling that

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week. Is it -- can we go back to the 12th?
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              THE COURT: Oh, okay. So, I -- let me hear what
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    other parties have to say. I'm okay from my standpoint, from a
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    chamber standpoint, I'm okay with January 12.
              Mr. Strickon, do you have a position on that?
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              MR. STRICKON: January 12th is fine, Your Honor.
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              THE COURT: Okay.
              MR. STRICKON: The only thing I would ask is if
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    we're -- if the hearing is not until January 12th, could we get
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    an extra few days for the filing of a brief?
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              THE COURT: Yeah, no, I think that's reasonable. So,
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    actually, hang on one sec.
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              What if I propose January 11 instead of 12? Is that
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    okay?
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              MR. STRICKON: Let me double check on there. January
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    11th is fine also.
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              THE COURT: Okay.
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              Mr. Nash?
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              MR. NASH: Yes, that would be fine, Judge.
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              THE COURT: Okay. So, January 11 at 10 a.m.
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              MR. STRICKON: January 11th.
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              THE COURT: And that'll be a Zoom hearing unless
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    people plan to put on testimony, in which case it'll be in the
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    courtroom.
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              Okay, briefing. So, the problem we're facing is
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    Christmas week. But, give me one second.
              So, Mr. Strickon, what if I gave you -- what if I
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    gave you till Wednesday, December 20?
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              MR. STRICKON: That's fine.
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              THE COURT: Okay.
              And Mr. Nash, what date do you want?
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              MR. NASH: Would it be okay with Your Honor if it was
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    the Wednesday, you know, at least 10 days before? If we're
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    going to do it on the 11th, maybe, if it's okay with Your
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    Honor. I don't have a calendar, but January 3 or 4, I assume
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    that's after New Year's.
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              THE COURT: Yeah, I'm going to give you until January
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    5, just because you're --
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              MR. NASH: Thank you.
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              THE COURT: -- the one who got the short stick in
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    terms of being forced to brief over the holidays.
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              MR. NASH: Right.
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              THE COURT: So, I'm giving you to Friday, January 5,
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    which is six days before the hearing.
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              MR. NASH: I appreciate that, Judge
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              THE COURT: Okay, I need to wrap up because I'm now
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    late for my next hearing. Is there any urgent final issue
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    anybody needs to raise?
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              Okay, I will see you all on January 11. Happy
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    Holidays to all of you.
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1	UNIDENTIFIED: You too. Thanks, Judge.
2	UNIDENTIFIED: And good luck with your procedure,
3	Judge.
4	UNIDENTIFIED: Thank you, you too, Judge.
5	UNIDENTIFIED: Good luck with the surgery.
6	UNIDENTIFIED: Yes.
7	THE COURT: Thank you very much.
8	MR. STRICKON: Take care.
9	THE COURT: Okay. Bye.
10	(Proceedings concluded)
11	* * * *
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14	CERTIFICATION
15	
16	I, Alicia Jarrett, court-approved transcriber, hereby
17	certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript from the
18	official electronic sound recording of the proceedings in the
19	
	above-entitled matter.
20	above-entitled matter.
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21	above-entitled matter.  Allicia J. famett
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